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Abstract 
In October 2014, the European Union requested consultations with Russia under the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system regarding Russia’s tariff treatment of various agricultural and manufacturing 
products. Although most of the measures challenged by the EU were individual tariff lines, the final 
measure in its complaint was a “more general measure” referred to as the systematic duty variation. A 
WTO dispute panel eventually ruled that the EU failed to establish the systematic nature of the duty 
treatment afforded by Russia to certain products. In this paper, we explore the dispute panel’s ruling, 
as well as how claims of systematic non-compliance are treated in other legal settings. We conclude 
by exploring whether future WTO panels should instead consider statistical evidence of systematic 
treatment to promote compliance. 
Keywords 
WTO Dispute Settlement; GATT; tariffs; systematic violations; statistical evidence. 
  1 
1. Introduction 
On October 31, 2014, the European Union requested consultations with Russia challenging twelve 
separate measures regarding Russia’s tariff treatment of various agricultural and manufacturing 
products. The EU claimed in “Russia-Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and Manufacturing 
Products” (Russia – Tariff Treatment) that each of the twelve measures were inconsistent with Article 
II:1(a) and (b) of GATT 1994, the article which spells out that members may not apply duties more 
than their bound duty rates, or the maximum duty rates that they agreed upon in their schedule of 
concessions. A panel was established on March 25 of 2015 to consider the EU’s complaints, and the 
panel report was circulated to members on August 12, 2016.  
Most of the measures challenged by the EU as being inconsistent with Article II were individual 
tariff lines associated with a variety of products. These eleven tariff lines, which included palm oil, 
refrigerators, and paper board products, accounted for nearly $880 million of European Union exports 
to Russia in 2014. Although this is approximately equivalent to the average size of dispute at the 
World Trade Organization, the products accounted for less than one percent of total EU exports to 
Russia.
1
 Press reports regarding the dispute even noted, “EU-Russia relations always have a share of 
mystery about them. And indeed, some WTO dispute settlement case[s] are very odd. In the case that 
the EU won in 2016 [Russia – Tariff Treatment], some critics questioned Brussels' rationale for 
litigating for palm oil. The EU does not export the product.”2 
However, the final measure in the EU’s complaint was characterized as a “more general measure 
consisting of systematic duty variations,” or SDVs, and five of the individual tariff lines challenged in 
the dispute (including palm oil) were examples of this SDV.
3
 The Appellate Body has widely 
recognized the general possibility to challenge unwritten measures in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings, and the EU has been successful in the past at pursuing such cases. As Conconi and 
Schepel (2017) explain, members can bring claims against measures `as such,’ regardless of whether 
and how these measures have been applied in particular cases. For example, in US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the Appellate Body explicitly held that "[i]n principle, any act or 
omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute 
settlement proceedings”.4 In US-Zeroing, the Appellate Body allowed for claims against unwritten 
rules as long as that rule had a “general and prospective application.”5 In these cases, complaining 
countries must substantiate that the measure exists specifically as they describe it. 
There have also been previous cases in which complainants alleged a “systematic” violation of 
WTO law, including, for instance, Argentina – Textiles and Apparels.6 The key question in this case, 
however, was the extent of the breach of WTO law. In Argentina – Textiles and Apparels, the Panel 
found (and the Appellate Body confirmed) that if the complainant has shown that a measure is apt to 
affect a certain category of tariffs it can be safely assumed that the measure is in all these instances in 
                                                     
1
 Bown and Reynolds (2015) reports that the mean value of trade associated with WTO disputes considered between 1995 
and 2011 was $927 million in 2014 dollars. 
2
 “COMMENT: Russia's first 4 years in WTO has been a litany of disputes. What next?” Intellinews - Russia This Week 
(September 30, 2016). LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2017/07/26. 
3
 Panel Report, Russia - Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and Manufacturing Products, WT/DS485/R, 12 August 
2016, para. 2.3. 
4
 Appellate Body Report, United States — Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel 
Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, 15 December 2003, para. 81. 
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(Zeroing), WT/DS294/AB/R, para.198. 
6
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violation of WTO law. It is then for the defendant to rebut the prima facie case established by the 
complainant. The European Union successfully litigated another dispute in which the application of an 
unwritten, systematic measure was at issue in Argentina – Import Measures.7 However, in this case 
there was sufficient other documentary evidence to prove the measure’s existence. Although there was 
also no direct proof, the Panel could establish the features of the measure from a variety of evidence, 
such as copies of domestic laws, regulations and policy documents; communications addressed to 
Argentine officials by private companies; statements by Argentine officials and notes posted on 
websites of the Argentine Government; articles in newspapers and magazines; statements by company 
officials; data from industry surveys; and reports prepared by market intelligence entities.
8
 In addition, 
the Argentine government had refused to make available certain pieces of evidence to the Panel 
(agreements between the Argentine government and importers), the existence of which was not denied 
by any party to the dispute.
9
  
Russia – Tariffs can be distinguished from Argentina – Textiles and Apparels in that it concerns the 
preliminary question of the very existence of the challenged measure. The case is also different from 
Argentina – Import Measures because unlike in that case there was no ‘hard’ evidence that proved the 
intentions of the Russian government, and the EU had to rely on other means to argue its case. The 
panel ultimately ruled that although each of the individual tariff lines challenged by the EU did violate 
Article II of the GATT, the EU failed to establish the existence of the SDV in their submission. 
Specifically, the panel determined that as set forth by the EU, the SDV consisted of three separate 
elements: “(1) the systematic application; (2) of certain types of tariff treatment; (3) to or in respect to 
a significant number of tariff lines.”10 Moreover, the SDV was further defined by the EU as a “general 
practice.” While the panel ruled that the EU adequately established the existence of “certain types of 
tariff treatment” applied to a “significant number of tariff lines,” it failed to establish that this tariff 
treatment was applied in a systematic fashion, nor that it was a general practice. 
As the EU failed to adequately prove that their proposed tariff treatment was systematic in nature, 
in this paper we first review the panel’s findings and then explore what evidence could have convinced 
the panel that such systematic treatment exists. To that end, we draw partially from the experience in 
other legal orders, particularly in the United States. We also briefly discuss the tension between 
conflicting objectives that arises from the introduction of “systematic non-compliance” claims, in 
particular between cost saving through reduced fact finding on the one hand and legal certainty on the 
other. 
Russia – Tariffs raises several other highly interesting questions of law. For example, the report 
touches upon the question of attribution in case of members of customs unions (CU), if they are 
required by the terms of the CU to impose the measure questions. It goes without saying that the case 
accordingly also relates to other issues that could arise in the context of the application of Article 
XXIV GATT 1994. However, given our limited focus on the EU’s claim of Russia’s “systematic non-
compliance” with its WTO obligations, such questions are outside the scope of this paper. 
2. Dispute Overview 
In the following section, we explore each of the characteristics of the SDV in turn, particularly the 
nature of a systematic or general practice, the evidence submitted by the European Union, as well as 
the panel’s findings on each characteristic. 
                                                     
7
 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS438/AB/R, 15 January 2015. 
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9
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2.1 “Certain Types of Tariff Treatment” 
Tariffs typically take one of two forms. An ad valorem tariff is one in which the duties are collected 
based upon the total value of imports. In other words, collected duties are defined by (p*q) * (x 
percent), where p is the price and q is the quantity of imports. A specific tariff, on the other hand, is 
one in which the duties are collected based upon the number of units imported, or q*y. As noted by the 
Appellate Body, “for any specific duty, there is an ad valorem equivalent deduced from the ratio of the 
absolute amount collected to the price of the imported product.”11 The ad valorem equivalent (AVE) 
of y, or the ad valorem rate which would result in the same value of duties collected as the specific rate 
of y, is y/p. The smaller the price, the larger the ad valorem equivalent of any specific tariff. 
Between 2010 and 2014, Russia’s applied tariffs were jointly determined by the members of the 
Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), whose members included Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In 
2015, the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) from this union was incorporated into the Eurasian 
Economic Union and membership was expanded to include Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The first six 
measures challenged by the EU in DS-485 alleged that Russia’s applied ad valorem tariffs as set forth 
in the CCT exceeded the bound ad valorem tariffs as set forth in Russia’s schedule of concessions, 
which was negotiated as part of its accession negotiations to the WTO in 2011. The panel concurred 
with the EU on all six measures in a fairly straight forward ruling.
 12
 
The next five measures, and indeed the “certain types of tariff treatment” defined in the SDV, 
required more analysis to assess the EU’s claims. Throughout the CCT, Russia uses a hybrid of ad 
valorem and specific tariffs known as either a “combined” or “mixed” duty rate; these combined duty 
rates essentially include alternative tariff rates. In the case of a combined duty rate of the form “x%, 
but not less than y per unit,” the specific duty rate serves as the minimum rate of duty. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, the AVE of this minimum rate decreases as the unit price increases, thus the applied tariff 
would be this minimum rate of duty y when the unit price is below the threshold ?̅?, and the ad valorem 
rate of x percent when the unit price exceeds this threshold. The threshold unit price can be calculated 
as the price in which 
𝑦
?̅?
= 𝑥%, or ?̅? =
𝑦
𝑥%
. 
The EU alleged in their submission to the panel that the combined duties associated with the 7
th
 to 
9
th
 measure of the form “x%, but not less than y per unit” as included in the CCT resulted in a 
violation of Article II of GATT 1994. In each of these measures, the bound duty in Russia’s schedule 
of concessions was essentially x percent, thus the EU argued that should the unit price ever fall below 
?̅?, Russia’s applied tariff would exceed its bound tariff rate. The only way to avoid such an 
inconsistency, according to the EU, would be to include some kind of cap or ceiling mechanism in the 
combined duty rate itself to prevent situations in which the duties levied would exceed the bound duty 
rates.  
In its defense, Russia argued that the EU was not incorporating the methodology that Russia 
developed to calculate the AVE of the specific tariffs during its accession negotiations. In its working 
party report, Russia asserted that it would ensure that the AVE of its specific tariff rates would be no 
higher than the ad valorem tariff rates in its combined duties. Specifically, each year Russia would 
determine whether it should raise the applied specific duty rate to ensure that it was no higher than the 
ad valorem component by calculating the AVE using the average unit prices from a five-year period, 
excluding data for years with the highest and lowest amount of trade during the period. Russia also 
argued in their submission to the panel that the European Union’s complaint was essentially about the 
structure of the applied duties—in other words about the use of a combined duty rate without a cap or 
ceiling mechanism.  
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 Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Textiles and Apparel, para. 50. 
12
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However, the EU argued and the panel concurred that while the procedure described above might 
ensure that on average the AVE of the specific tariff does not exceed the ad valorem tariff in the 
applied combination tariff, it was not designed to ensure that the combined tariff rate does not exceed 
Russia’s bound tariff rate. The panel specifically stated that Article II(b) “prohibits duties imposed in 
excess of a bound duty, even if these duties are balanced or offset (at the same time or later) by duties 
imposed on identical products that are below the bound duty.”13  
The panel also confirmed that according to the Appellate Body, applying a duty type different from 
the duty type in the member’s schedule of concessions is not inconsistent with Article II:1(b).14 
Moreover, the panel emphasized that the EU was not challenging the lack of a ceiling mechanism, 
rejecting Russia’s view that the challenge was about the structure of the duty. The panel agreed with 
the EU’s analysis, and ruled that the 7th to 9th measures were inconsistent with Article II: 1(b). 
In the tenth and eleventh measures challenged by the EU, Russia’s applied tariff also took the form 
of “x%, but not less than y per unit,” however Russia’s bound tariff took the form of “z%; or x% but 
not less than y per unit; whichever is the lower.” This combined duty is also illustrated in Figure 1. In 
this example, when the unit price falls below ?̂?, the bound duty would be z percent, which is a lower 
ad valorem rate than either x percent or the AVE of y. Between the price of ?̂? and ?̅?, the bound duty 
would be y per unit, which is lower than z percent but higher than x percent; above the price of ?̅? the 
bound would be x percent. The value of ?̂? can also be determined as the unit price at which 𝑧% =
𝑦
𝑝
, 𝑜𝑟 ?̂? =
𝑦
𝑧%
. 
The EU claimed, and the panel concurred, that while the applied and bound rates of the tenth and 
eleventh measure were equivalent to one another above the price of ?̂?, below the price of ?̂? the applied 
rate of y per unit exceeded the bound rate of z percent. 
In evaluating whether the SDV could be defined as a “certain type of tariff treatment,” the panel 
defined two types. The first included measures in which the applied tariff took the form of “x%, but 
not less than y per unit” and the bound tariff was an ad valorem tariff, as in measures seven to nine. 
Note that the panel ruled in this first “type” that the bound ad valorem rate could be either equal to or 
more than x percent. The second included measures in which the applied tariff took the form of “x%, 
but not less than y per unit,” but the bound rate took the form “z%; or x%, but not less than y per unit; 
whichever is lower,” where the value of z% was higher than x%, as in measures ten and eleven. 
2.2 Significant Number of Tariff Lines? 
As noted above, the European Union stated in their panel submission that the SDV impacted a 
“significant number of tariff lines.” The panel interpreted the EU’s use of this word to indicate that the 
number of lines effected was quantitatively important, but that the “significant number of tariff lines” 
did not mean all, or nearly all, tariff lines, but merely a large, substantial, or considerable number of 
tariff lines.
15 
 
The European Union submitted an illustrative list of 39 tariff lines that met the definition of the 
certain type of tariff treatment as evidence of the existence of the SDV. These tariff lines, which 
included the three lines specifically included as the seventh through ninth measures in the petition, 
were from five chapters of the Harmonized System. Thus, including the tenth and eleventh measures, 
the panel confirmed that there were at least 41 tariff lines that could be considered as part of the SDV. 
                                                     
13
 Ibid., para. 7.33. 
14
 Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Textiles and Apparel, para. 50. 
15
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The European Union submitted into evidence Decision No. 52 (Exhibit EU-6) and Decision No. 
103 (Exhibit EU-8), which established the applied duty rates set by Russia relating to its claims 
concerning the seventh to ninth measures at issue.
16
 These legal documents also established the 
applied tariff rates for 21 of the other tariff lines included in the illustrative list. Because the European 
Union did not provide the relevant excerpts from the CCT that would demonstrate the existence of the 
other applied duty rates alleged in the Illustrative List, the panel could only rule on the evidence 
establishing the existence of 23 lines (21 from the illustrative list and measures 10 and 11) that met the 
“certain type of tariff treatment” criteria.17 
Although the panel noted that the 23 tariff lines was not a significant proportion of the total number 
of tariff lines in the CCT, it could be considered a significant number of tariff lines when compared to 
the five tariff lines specifically considered by the panel. 
2.3 Systematic Application 
According to the Panel, the key criterion to ascertain whether a certain type of tariff treatment is 
“systematically applied” is to reveal a system, plan, or organized method or effort that connects the 
individual instances of application of particular types of tariff treatment. 
Interestingly, to give meaning to the term “systematically applied” the Panel turned to the wording 
of the EU’s written submission. In other words, to develop a standard of how to assess whether there is 
systematic application of the alleged treatment, the Panel considered that the wording of the EU’s 
submission is a useful and permissible source of information. On this basis, the Panel first found that 
“the systematic nature of the measure's application consists in something other than the mere fact that 
it applies to or affects a significant number of tariff lines.”18 Given that the EU itself did not suggest a 
definition of the term, the Panel continued thereafter with the term’s textual meaning. Based on the 
relevant dictionary definitions, the Panel found that the term can be used to describe “violations that 
are the consequence of a system, plan, or organized method.”19 
The Panel turned next to a statement of the Appellate Body in Argentina – Import Measures. In this 
report, the AB contrasted the ‘sporadic’ to the ‘systematic’ application of a measure. In view of the 
AB, the ‘systematic’ nature of the measure at issue was evidenced in the fact that it “applied to 
economic operators in a broad variety of different sectors as part of an organized effort, coordinated 
and implemented at the highest levels of government, and aimed at achieving import substitution and 
reduction of trade deficit within the framework of the "managed trade" policy.”20 From this statement 
the Panel extracted that ‘systematic application’ refers “to a situation where individual applications in 
a broad variety of different economic sectors are connected ("related") to one another inasmuch as 
they are all the result of an "organized effort" undertaken in support of a particular "aim".”21 
It is unclear whether the mentioned aspects should indeed be the criteria for assessing whether a 
measure is systematic, at least in the case at hand. First it is unclear why economic operators in a 
broad variety of different sectors should be affected. One could argue that precisely targeting a few, 
specific sectors is characteristic of a systematic measure. Second, there is no reason to assume that an 
organized effort is a precondition. As even the Panel admits in a later part of the report, no inquiry into 
the subjective intentions of the parties involved is required. However, if there is no need to ascertain 
                                                     
16
 Ibid., para. 7.360. 
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 Ibid., para. 7.359. 
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 Ibid., para. 7.307. 
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the objective pursued with the measure, how can one say that there is any organization nor effort? In 
sum, the AB’s statement in Argentina – Import Measures was arguably useful for the Argentina case 
but bears little relevance for the case the Panel had to decide.  
Finally, the Panel addressed the question of whether “systematic application” of a measure requires 
a certain frequency of application. The panel found that this was not necessarily the case even though 
it added that in some cases observed repetition can be a clear indication for a systematic activity.
 22
 
The panel seemed open to the submission of evidence in the form of statistical analysis of the pattern 
of violations, noting that it is theoretically possible to “infer the existence of a system where the 
observed repetition is so substantial as to render it more likely than not” that an underlying system 
exists. In other words, the repetition itself could be submitted as evidence from which the existence of 
a system could be inferred.
23
 
Against this background the Panel assessed whether the European Union had adduced sufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie case. The Panel found that the EU had failed to do so. The key 
evidence relied upon by the European Union to prove the systematicity of the SDV consisted of 
several tariff lines included in the Illustrative List.
24
 The evidential test the Panel applied was to ask 
“whether the tariff lines submitted as evidence are so numerous as to make it more likely than not that 
an underlying system exists”.25 To this end, the Panel deemed it necessary to “to compare the 
frequency with which the relevant types of tariff treatment have been accorded in the present dispute 
with the total number of tariff lines in respect of which the relevant type of tariff treatment could 
potentially have been applied (that is, the universe of all possibly affected tariff lines). If the difference 
were small, then it might be justified to infer that the relevant types of tariff treatment have been 
applied systematically.”26 
The Panel considered the following as possible ‘universes of affected tariff lines’ against which the 
23 tariff lines submitted by the EU should be compared:  
 all tariff lines contained in the CCT;
27
 or 
 the total number of tariff lines contained in the CCT for which the bound duty rate is expressed 
in either ad valorem or the relevant combined duty form.
28
 
Eventually, the Panel found that it did not have to decide which would be the appropriate comparator 
because the EU had not provided the relevant information for any of these two possibilities.
29
 Thus, 
the Panel decided based solely on the allocation of the burden of proof. 
Despite this finding the Panel continued its analysis and distinguished the case at hand from the 
AB’s approach in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, in which the AB had found an inconsistency with 
respect to all relevant tariff categories, even though the complaining party had only submitted 
evidence relating to 118, or at most 124, out of approximately 940 relevant tariff lines.
30
 The Panel 
rejected the EU’s reliance on this case because the referenced passage concerned the consistency with 
the covered agreements and not the question of whether the measure existed in the first place. By 
contrast to the case at hand, the measures in the report were “described in a set of distinct documents” 
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 Ibid. 
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and accordingly there was no uncertainty as to the measure's existence. In addition, in the Argentina 
case the AB found the measure to be inconsistent by “structure and design” and simply extended this 
finding to additional tariff lines.
31
 By contrast, in Russia – Tariff Treatment the very question was 
whether there was any “structure and design” in Russia’s tariff schedule. 
On this basis, the Panel was unable to infer from the 23 demonstrated instances of relevant tariff 
treatment that other tariff lines exist that have also been subjected to the particular types of tariff 
treatment at issue.
32
 In and of itself, the Panel considered the 23 tariff lines to be inconclusive as to the 
question of whether it is more likely than not that they form part of a ‘system’ or ‘plan’.33 
Subsequently, the Panel considered whether there was any other evidence to prove the alleged 
“system.” Notably, the Panel did not require proof of the subjective intentions of the Russian 
government but ‘objective’ connections or relationships between the identified instances of tariff 
treatment,
34
 which rather contradicts the Panel’s previous definition of a “system”. For there to be such 
a connection, the Panel identified four constitutive elements: first, each instance is an example of a 
particular kind of tariff treatment; second, each instance is embodied (i.e. is written down) in the CCT; 
third, each individual instance, and the CCT itself, is legally binding and has general and prospective 
application; and fourth, the relevant types of tariff treatment have been accorded repeatedly.
35
  
The Panel concluded as follows: 
 the mere fact that different chapters were affected does not prove that there is a system in place, 
if there is no explanation provided as to the connection between them.
36
  
 even accepting that the 23 instances of duty type/structure variation identified by the European 
Union were the result of decisions establishing the relevant duty rates, this element by itself did 
not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the resulting instances of duty variation were 
inter-connected and formed part of a common system, plan or organized method or effort.  
2.4 “General Practice” 
The Panel defined the term ‘general practice’ as an indication ‘that the SDV is not confined to 
particular parts of the CCT or specific tariff lines’. In other words, what mattered was whether the 
alleged types of tariff treatment could be observed throughout the CCT and not only in some of its 
chapters.  
As potential evidence for the existence of such a ‘general practice’ the Panel primarily focused on 
the Illustrative list. However, for the following reasons the Panel found that the Illustrative List could 
not be considered proof for the existence of general practice so defined: first, the Illustrative List only 
contained examples from five chapters, whereas the CCT consists of at least 87 chapters. This, the 
Panel stated, was not sufficient. Thus, at least implicitly the Panel found that the sample was too small. 
Second, the European Union had only provided documentary evidence in respect of 23 tariff lines but 
not for the remaining 18 tariff lines in the Illustrative List. Again, the Panel considered the lack of 
documentary evidence decisive for its evaluation of the evidence and therefore disregarded the latter 
18 tariff lines.  
Table 1 summarizes the panel’s findings regarding each of the elements of the SDV. 
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3. Systematic non-compliance in other legal orders 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of how other legal orders or branches of law identify 
alleged systematic non-compliance. To this end, the approaches deployed under the (international) 
human rights regime and US law are sketched out. In both legal orders the question of systematic 
rights violations has gained some prominence, although only the latter developed an analytical 
framework to distinguish ‘systematic’ patterns from randomly occurring phenomena.  
3.1 Systematic Violations in (International) Human Rights Law 
In international human rights law, the concept of a “systematic” violation is often used to express the 
gravity or seriousness of the behavior in question. For instance, according to the OHCHR (2012), 
‘human rights violations … can also count as gross violations if they are grave and systematic, for 
example violations taking place on a large scale or targeted at particular population groups.’ Scholars 
as Medina Quiroga (1988) and Ermacora (1974), on the other hand, have tried to define the term in a 
manner that renders it a bit more operational and propose three or four criteria that must be satisfied 
for a finding of a ‘gross and systematic’ violation, such as: (i) quantity; (ii) time; (iii) quality; and (iv) 
planning.  
There is also some practice in the European Human Rights System that addresses the question of 
“systematic” violations of the Convention. The European Commission on Human Rights stated in a 
report that: 
“Although one single act contrary to the Convention is sufficient to establish a violation, it is 
evidence that the violation can be regarded as being more serious if it is not simply one 
outstanding event but forms part of a number of similar events which might even form a pattern.” 
(European Commission of Human Rights (1977)) 
In a case concerning an administrative practice, the European Court of Human Rights found a 
systematic violation to ‘consist of an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are 
sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but 
to a pattern or system’.37 
It remains unclear, however, what is meant by a “pattern” or “system” and how to identify it. 
Accordingly, it seems that there is no common understanding in (international) human rights law as to 
what precisely amounts to “systematic” violation, how to discern it nor how to distinguish it from 
other, non-systematic but frequently occurring violations of human rights. The proposed elements 
remain vague and entail a significant amount of discretion. None of the approaches suggests a clear 
methodology as how to distinguish ‘systematic’ from other observed phenomena and in particular 
leave open what measuring scale could be employed. Hence, it seems the term’s main purpose is to be 
used as a label in the legal and political discourse but not as a test to identify certain types of 
infringements.  
3.2 Pattern and Practice Cases under US Law 
Questions akin to whether certain measures amount to systematic infringements of certain rights have 
been subject to a number of court decisions in the United States, such as in so called “pattern and 
practice cases.” The key issue in these cases is whether a disparity between any two demographic 
groups, in terms of hiring, promotion, and even jury compositions, is more likely to be the result of 
discrimination than of benign, nondiscriminatory causes. The underlying assumption in these cases is 
that the treatment of the alleged type is the defendant’s “standard operating procedure” and that the 
many individual decisions form a pattern that a court can adjudicate. In cases attacking implicit 
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policies, plaintiffs may offer statistical proof of widespread disparities to demonstrate both that the 
implied discriminatory policy exists and that the resulting disparities are sufficiently large to evidence 
a widespread discriminatory intent, i.e., a pattern and practice. Thus, no direct proof for intentional 
discrimination, such as documents or testimony, is required but the showing of pattern and practice 
evidences that the alleged treatment is not a random phenomenon but the result of some planning. 
Given that pattern and practice cases usually concern instances of systematic discrimination, many 
circuits hold that they are only suitable for class actions.
38
  
In pattern and practice cases US law essentially works with a shift of the burden of proof in two-
stages.
39
 In the first phase, the complainant needs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. the 
‘more likely than not’ standard of proof) a pattern and practice of discrimination. If the complainant 
prevails in the first stage, the burden of proof shifts. In the second stage, a rebuttable presumption 
applies that every decision/act of the defendant concerning the group/class that was found to have 
been discriminated in stage one results from the discriminatory practice. The main advantage of being 
able to prove a pattern and practice is accordingly an easement of the burden of proof for the 
complainant. Otherwise a complainant would have to show that every individual decision or act 
amounts to discrimination. Having proven that there is an underlying pattern or system, it is now for 
the defendant to prove the contrary.  
The main evidence to be provided by a plaintiff in the first stage is statistical evidence, at times 
supplemented with anecdotal testimony that brings the statistical evidence “convincingly to life.” This 
evidence then must show “gross statistical disparities” between the treatment of the two groups. The 
Supreme Court stated that “two or three standard deviations” usually amount to such disparities, lower 
courts found ‘statistically significant’ differences to suffice.  
By contrast to the human rights regime, US law provides concrete guidance on how to discern 
systematic non-compliance. In addition, the consequences of showing such non-compliance are clearly 
spelled-out, i.e. a shift of the burden of proof. Given that the approach is based on general statistical 
methods it is not confined to a certain branch of law and could therefore be applied in the WTO 
framework, too. In addition, also in US “pattern and practice” cases the question addressed with 
statistical methods is –as in Russia – Tariffs – whether the measure exists in the first place and not 
whether it complies with the applicable legal rules.  
Transposed to the trade law context one could instead of comparing two groups of people, compare 
two types of products – e.g. import sensitive v. non-import sensitive. Which group of products, tariffs, 
regulation or other population should be compared would, of course, be a question of the facts of the 
individual case and the alleged ‘theory of harm’ underlying the ‘systematic violation claim’ that is put 
forward by the complainant.  
In parallelism to US law, the procedural consequences resulting could be easily applied in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings as well. That is to say, if a party is able to show some discernable 
pattern affecting a certain group of products in violation of WTO law (stage 1), the burden of proving 
that a product from the respective group is not detrimentally affected would shift to the defendant 
(stage 2). Such an allocation of the burden of proof would correspond to the current practice of the 
Appellate Body, according to which once a claimant has established a case of prima facie violation, 
the burden of proof shifts onto the defendant who would then have to submit affirmative evidence to 
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the contrary.
40
 Only if the defendant overcomes the prima facie case established by the claimant the 
burden of proof would shift back.  
4. Statistical Proof of “Systematic” Treatment 
In this section, we explore whether there may have been statistical evidence that the EU could have 
submitted in support of their claim that the tariff treatment was systematically applied using statistical 
techniques similar to those used in US pattern and practice cases. To assess the systematic nature of 
the “certain types of tariff treatment” described above, we collected Russia’s applied and bound duty 
rates by ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) in 2014 from the World Trade Organization’s Tariff 
Analysis Online database.
41
 We found 66 examples of the certain type of tariff treatment among 
Russia’s duty schedule, accounting for 0.6 percent of all HS tariff lines. Note that the two tariff lines 
challenged in the petition of the second form of violation, those in which the bound tariff took the 
form of “z%; or x%, but not less than y per unit; whichever is lower,” were the only instances of this 
form of violation that we could identify within Russia’s tariff schedule.  
As noted by the panel in their discussion of the illustrative list, a visual inspection of these tariff 
lines does not suggest a clear pattern. For example, the tariff lines that would be classified under the 
SDV arise in twelve separate HS Chapters, although over half are in two chapters-- Vehicles (Chapter 
87) and Meat (Chapter 2). In 30 percent of the tariff lines, the ad valorem component of the mixed 
applied duty rate was equal to the bound ad valorem tariff rate, and in another 25 percent of these tariff 
lines the ad valorem component was less than the bound tariff rate. In the remaining 28 tariff lines, the 
ad valorem component of the mixed applied tariff rate exceeded the bound tariff rate, thus the tariff 
line would potentially violate Article II of the GATT with or without the addition of the minimum 
specific tariff rate. 
The terms systematic and systemic discrimination are often used interchangeably in the pattern and 
practice cases described above, whereby discrimination is alleged to have occurred based on an 
observable trait such as gender, race, or ethnic origin.
42
 Generally in legal cases alleging systematic 
discrimination (also known as direct discrimination or disparate treatment), the complainant has a 
priori beliefs regarding the grounds by which such discrimination is taking place, thus outcomes such 
as employment status can be compared across targeted and non-targeted groups. Although the EU 
does not posit such grounds in their submission to the panel, for the purposes of illustration we 
hypothetically suggest that the EU could have proposed to the panel that Russia used the SDV as part 
of a plan to increase the level of protection on products based on several different characteristics.  
For example, assume that the EU posited that Russia used the SDV as part of their strategy to 
increase the level of protection even further for highly protected products. Consider Table 2, which 
presents the frequency HS tariff lines that fall into the SDV category amongst highly-protected and 
other products. We define highly-protected products as those whose ad valorem bound tariffs are in 
the top twenty five percent of all bound ad valorem tariffs.  
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The selection rate is the proportion of HS tariff lines that have been chosen for the SDV tariff 
treatment. Among highly-protected products, 38 out of the 1,880 highly-protected products were 
assigned the SDV tariff treatment, for a selection rate of 2 percent. The corresponding selection rate 
for other products is 0.4 percent. These proportions can be compared in several different ways. For 
example, the simple difference (2 - 0.4 = 1.6) indicates that the highly-protected selection rate is 1.6 
percentage points higher than the selection rate for other products. The simple ratio (2/0.4 = 5) 
indicates that the highly-protected selection rate is 5 times that of other products.  
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)’s Uniform Guidelines on 
Employment Selection suggests that there should be no more than an 80 percent difference in the 
selection rate between any two groups (King (2007:278)). This is sometimes known as the four-fifths 
rule. In this case, there is a 500 percent difference in the rates at which products were “selected” for 
the SDV. 
Court cases such as Castaneda v. Partida and Hazelwood School District v. United States have 
instead relied on a binomial statistical test, which compares the actual number of products selected for 
the SDV with the expected number selected based on the proportion of highly-protected products in 
the tariff schedule. In this case, highly-protected products account for 23 percent of the population of 
tariff lines, thus we would expect 15 of the 64 tariff lines receiving SDV treatment to be selected from 
amongst the import sensitive products. Comparing this difference (38-15=23) to the standard deviation 
(or the spread) of the binomial process results in the binomial test statistic.
43
 As discussed in King 
(2007), the U.S. court noted in Castaneda v. Partida that “social scientists general concern themselves 
when the difference exceeds two or three standard errors.” In this case, the standard deviation of the 
binomial process is 3.4, and the disparity between the actual number of tariff lines selected for SDV 
treatment and the expected number is 6.7 times the standard deviation. 
Assume instead that the EU believed that Russia’s SDV unfairly targeted Russia’s most imported 
products. Defining “high import value” products as those six-digit HS products in the top quarter of 
import values, we can conduct a similar analysis using the statistics in Table 3. In this case, although 
the actual number of line items receiving SDV treatment was 31, the predicted number based on the 
high-import value products share in the population is 18. This disparity is 3.6 times the standard 
deviation. 
Economic theory may suggest other potential motivations for instituting a systematic tariff 
structure that increases protection levels. For example, economists have long hypothesized that 
welfare maximizing countries should impose higher levels of protection on products in which they 
have market power, or those products that are supplied inelastically. Intuitively, although tariffs 
typically result in welfare loss due to the imposition of production and consumption distortions, tariffs 
imposed on products that are supplied inelastically (or those imported by so-called “large countries”) 
will reduce the world price of those products, thus potentially increasing the welfare of the importing 
countries. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) demonstrate theoretically that such behavior provides one 
potential motivation for the World Trade Organization—the WTO’s principle of reciprocity allows 
countries to negotiate an escape from the inefficient equilibrium in which total welfare is lower as a 
result of all countries imposing tariffs to improve their terms-of-trade.  
Recent literature, including in such papers as Broda et al. (2008), find evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that countries set higher tariffs on products in which they have more market power.
44
 
Similarly, Bagwell and Staiger (2011) find strong support for the theory that one of the primary 
rationales for the multilateral trading system is to escape from a terms-of-trade driven inefficient 
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equilibrium, at least among their sample of countries, including Russia, that had recently acceded to 
the WTO. Bown and Reynolds (2017) find similar econometric evidence that terms of trade 
motivations may play a significant role in the outcomes of WTO disputes. We also test this theory by 
analyzing whether Russia is more likely to apply SDV treatment to products in which they have more 
market power, or which are supplied inelastically. Specifically, using the export supply elasticities 
calculated in Broda et al. (2008), we test whether the SDV treatment is more likely amongst inelastic 
products, or those whose inverse export supply elasticity is in the upper tercile of Russian imported 
products.
45
 The results are included in Table 4. Note that the expected number of products that should 
have received SDV treatment among those products with market power is 20, only a two-product 
difference from what is observed or 0.536 times the standard deviation of the binomial process. Thus, 
we reject the hypothesis that that Russia is targeting those products in which it has more market 
power. 
More generally, one could use a k x 2 test to compare proportions across k categories of products, 
and use a Pearson Chi-Squared Test for independence to test whether the proportions of the outcome 
(in this case the SDV treatment) across categories is significantly different than what one would 
expect to find based on the proportion of each category in the full sample (Romei and Ruggieri 
(2014)). When we conducted such a test across two-digit HS chapters, we find statistical evidence that 
SDV products are not evenly distributed across chapters but rather concentrated in certain sectors like 
transportation equipment.
46
  
As discussed in Paetzold and Willborn (2002), legal cases associated systemic disparate treatment 
allegations have also used logistic regression to analyze selection decisions, particularly when there 
may be a variety of factors that influence the decision to accord SDV treatment. Estimates of the odds 
ratios from such an analysis are included in Table 5. As illustrated in Column 1 of the table, highly 
protected products are 473 percent more likely to be assigned SDV treatment by Russia than other 
products, while those with the highest value of imports are 274 percent more likely to be assigned 
SDV treatment.
47
 Column 2 of Table 5 includes HS Chapter dummies as additional controls. Results 
for highly protected products are virtually the same, even controlling for the chapter of the product, 
suggesting that after controlling for the fact that transportation equipment (for example) is more likely 
to be assigned SDV treatment, it is the most protected products within the category that are more 
likely to be afforded SDV treatment. Interestingly, results from this logistic regression suggest that 
Russia is more likely to accord SDV treatment to those products in which it has more market power 
after controlling for the broad, two-digit product category—products in the upper tercile of values of 
the inverse export supply elasticity are 309 percent more likely to be afforded SDV treatment within 
the same two-digit HS chapter. 
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 The Chi-Squared Test Statistic can be calculated as 𝜒2 = ∑
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𝑘 , where k indexes HS chapters, O is the observed 
number of tariff lines assigned the SDV treatment and E is the expected number of tariff lines assigned the SDV 
treatment based on the proportion of tariff lines within that HS chapter. The Pearson Chi-Squared Test testing the 
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5. Should WTO Members be able to claim systematic violations? 
We have shown that it would have been in principle possible for the EU to prove the existence of the 
SDV based on indirect evidence such as statistical methods even without access to “incriminating” 
documents. In this section, we discuss some pros and cons of allowing claims of “systematic” 
violations in the WTO dispute settlement that rest on indirect proof, such as the statistical methods 
discussed supra. 
5.1 Arguments in favor  
There are a number of arguments in support of allowing the claims of the type advanced by the EU. 
First, relying on statistical generalizations is less expensive than a full-fledged investigation of all 
possible infringements. By not having to prove every individual infringement but only the underlying 
system, fact finding costs may be reduced for all participants. Thereby, the costs of litigating a case 
may be lowered to a level that is worthwhile pursuing, which would increase enforcement. Without 
these types of claims, it may be impossible for complainants to argue and prove their case because of 
the sheer number of violations. Thus, not allowing ‘systematic violation complaints’ would in fact 
favor non-compliant WTO Members and those that are particularly quick to change their tariff or 
regulatory regimes, thereby making it much more difficult for complainants to enforce WTO rules, 
due to the length of WTO dispute settlement procedure. 
Second, allowing complainants to rely on indirect evidence could mitigate information 
asymmetries. Usually, one could argue, there is some reason why a pattern is discernible in a tariff or 
regulatory regime, even when this reason is unknown. Thus, if there is a robust evidence to show a 
pattern, and the complainant is also able to provide some kind of ‘theory of harm’ that supports the 
evidence, it is justified to shift the burden of proof to the party that is more likely to possess the private 
information necessary to explain why the system is benign in nature.  
5.2 Arguments against  
However, there are also considerations militating against the possibility to prove the existence of 
systematic violations solely based on statistical evidence. First, allowing claims that are solely based 
on indirect evidence could unnecessarily impair legal certainty. As of today, there is no clear 
benchmark as to what amounts to a systematic violation of WTO law. For instance, it is already 
unclear how many instances of non-compliance are required or what scale the violations must have for 
there to be systematic non-compliance. Accordingly, instead of providing guidance to WTO Member, 
the law would not establish any clear standard according to which governments could enact their 
policies. Thus, rather than enhancing the predictability and certainty of the global trade regime, there 
would be less legal certainty for governments and eventually also private traders.  
On the other hand, there are many instances in which the law – at least at the margins – is not clear-
cut and requires clarification through case-law. This is precisely what could be developed through the 
case law of WTO Panels and the Appellate Body. Thus, not being able to tell conclusively what 
behavior amounts to a systematic violation does not as such exclude the possibility to rely on indirect 
evidence for these types of complaints.  
Second, it is unclear what a finding of a systematic violation would require in terms of compliance. 
Given that the finding does not only concern individual tariff lines (or other rules), it would not suffice 
to simply alter the instances that form the sample which prove the infringement. Eventually, it would 
probably rather be necessary to identify each single instance in which the “system” might lead to 
frustration of a Member State’s WTO obligations. Thus, while no full-fledged fact finding would be 
required to bring the complaint it could become necessary afterwards, when the defendant seeks to 
bring its regime into compliance with a ruling.  
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On the other hand, one could argue that such increased compliance efforts are simply the result of a 
governments previous non-compliance. Accordingly, it would be justified to impose additional costs 
on the actor who has caused the breach, also to induce future compliance.  
6. Conclusion 
In 2016, a WTO dispute panel ruled that certain of Russia’s combined tariffs violated Article II of 
GATT 1994, concurring with the European Union that those combined tariffs could exceed Russia’s 
bound ad valorem if unit prices fell below certain thresholds. However, the panel ruled that the EU 
failed to establish that the imposition of these combined tariffs was “systematically applied,” meaning 
something that is “done according to a system, plan or organized method.” 
The panel inferred that it could not undertake an analysis of whether the tariff treatment was 
systematically applied without observing whether the application was more or less frequent among the 
universe of all tariff lines, and that the European Union did not submit evidence allowing for such 
analysis. In this paper, we review how other branches of law, particularly (international) human rights 
and US disparate treatment law identify alleged systematic non-compliance, and whether similar 
approaches could be used within the WTO dispute settlement system. Although there are some 
potential pitfalls with allowing such an approach, it could potentially lower litigation costs and 
increase compliance.  
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Figure 1 
Combined Duty Rates 
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Table 1 
Overview of the Panel’s Finding in Relation to the SDV 
 
Issue Definition Evidence Finding of 
the Panel 
Systematic 
application 
a system, plan, or organized method or 
effort that connects the individual 
instances of application of particular 
types of tariff treatment 
 Illustrative List 
 10th and 11th 
measure 
No 
Certain types 
of tariff 
treatment 
Two types of tariff treatment: 
 combined duty rate in respect of a 
tariff line with abound ad valorem 
rate  
 combined duty rate in the form of 
"x% but not less than y per unit" in 
respect of a tariff line subject to a 
bound combined duty rate in the 
form of "z%; or x% but no less 
than y per unit; whichever is the 
lower", where the value of "z" is 
higher than "x". 
 
 7th to 11th measure Yes 
Significant 
number of 
tariff lines 
a large, substantial, or considerable 
number of tariff lines  Illustrative List 
 Decision No. 52 
(Exhibit EU-6) and 
Decision No. 103 
(Exhibit EU-8) 
Yes 
General 
Practice 
indicates that the SDV is not confined to 
particular parts of the CCT  Illustrative List 
 10th and 11th 
measure 
No 
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Table 2 
Number of HS Tariff Lines (Share of Row), Highly Protected Products 
Group SDV Other Total 
Highly Protected 38 (2.0) 1,842 (98.0) 1,880 (100.0) 
All Others 26 (0.4) 6,278 (99.6) 6,304 (100.0) 
Total 64 (0.8) 8,120 (99.2) 8,184 (100.0) 
Table 3 
Number of HS Tariff Lines (Share of Row), Import Value 
Group SDV Other Total 
High Import Value 31 (1.0) 3,071 (99.0) 3,102 (100.0) 
All Others 35 (0.4) 8,136 (99.6) 8,171 (100.0) 
Total 66 (0.6) 11,207 (99.4) 11,273 (100.0) 
Table 4 
Number of HS Tariff Lines (Share of Row), High Inverse Export Elasticities 
Group SDV Other Total 
High Inverse Exp.  
Elasticity 
18 (0.6) 3,213 (99.4) 3,231 (100.0) 
All Others 47 (0.7) 7,135 (99.3) 7,182 (100.0) 
Total 65 (0.6) 10,348 (99.4) 10,413 (100.0) 
Table 5  
Likelihood of SDV Treatment (Odds Ratio) 
 
(1) (2) 
   Highly Protected 4.733*** 4.512*** 
 
(1.221) (1.550)) 
High Import Value 2.749*** 1.656* 
 
(0.701) (0.501) 
High Inverse Exp. 0.621 3.093*** 
 Supply Elasticity (0.181) (1.236) 
   
Chapter Fixed Effects No Yes 
No. of Observations 7,495 7,495 
Pseudo R
2 
0.07 0.22 
Notes: Odds ratios from the logistic regression estimating 
determinants of the likelihood of SDV status. ***, * 
indicates odds ratios significant at the 1 % and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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